charges," opportunity to present a defense, 12 and intraunion appeal. 13 Only procedural fairness was reviewed by the courts, however, and the common law hearing requirement thus provided only very limited protection to the locals. The substantive findings of the hearing officers, who were personnel of the international serving in both prosecutorial and judicial roles, were not reviewed.
14 In Fanara v. Teamsters, 15 for example, the New York Supreme Court held a trusteeship invalid because the international had not presented specific charges to the local. After the international met the procedural requirement, however, the court validated the trusteeship, specifically refusing to consider substantive attacks on its validity. 14 Combining the prosecutorial and judicial functions recently has been held not to violate the fair hearing requirement. rupt leadership, 9 using the locals as pawns in intraunion battles, 20 and depriving members of their right to self-government for long periods. 2 1 Although procedural fairness was not the primary focus of the hearings, 22 testimony before the Committee indicated that even the minimal common law procedural safeguards were not always respected. 23 In response to these problems, the Committee recommended legislation that would limit the purposes for which trusteeships could be established.
24
During the legislative hearings on the LMRDA, it became apparent that the procedural safeguards provided by the common law fair hearing requirement were insufficient. 25 Both the Senate and the House Committee Reports on Title III state in identical language: "The legal theory applied by courts is often inadequate. A trusteeship will ordinarily be set aside unless the local is given a fair hearing including notice of the charges and an opportunity to defend. the local to the international. 30 Finally, to prevent the manipulation of locals in union political battles, Title III prohibits the election of union officials or delegates to union conventions unless all local members in good standing are allowed to vote by secret ballot.,' The substantive protections provided by the LMRDA can be enforced by the Secretary of Labor or any member of the local in federal district court, 32 and are to be "in addition to any and all other rights and remedies at law or in equity."
33
A trusteeship established for one of the approved purposes, in conformity with the constitution and bylaws of the labor organization, and authorized or ratified after a fair hearing is presumed valid for eighteen months. 34 Thereafter there is a presumption of invalidity. The statute does not indicate, however, the status to be accorded a trusteeship imposed for a valid purpose without a hearing, or under what circumstances the courts are to presume valid a trusteeship imposed with only a postimposition, or "ratification," hearing.
35
The ambiguity surrounding the status of such trusteeships under the LMRDA should be resolved by incorporation of the common law hearing requirement into the statute. As the foregoing discussion of the LMRDA indicates, such judicial construction would be consistent with In any proceeding pursuant to this section a trusteeship established by a labor organization in conformity with the procedural requirements of its constitution and bylaws and authorized or ratified after a fair hearing either before the executive board or before such other body as may be provided in accordance with its constitution or bylaws shall be presumed valid for a period of eighteen months from the date of its establishment and shall not be subject to attack during such period except upon clear and convincing proof that such trusteeship was not established or maintained in good faith or for a purpose allowable under section 462 of this title. After the expiration of eighteen months the trusteeship shall be presumed invalid in any such proceeding and its discontinuance shall be decreed unless the labor organization shall show by dear and convincing proof that the continuation of the trusteeship is necessary for a purpose allowable under section 802. In the latter event the court may dismiss the complaint or retain jurisdiction of the cause on such conditions and for such period as it deems appropriate. The primary purpose behind this section was to limit the duration of trusteeships. S. REP_ 38 the court held that the common law powers of an international to place a local in trusteeship were nullified by the enactment of the LMRDA. This holding rested on the Senate Report's concurrence in the McClellan Committee's finding that national legislation was needed to limit the right of internationals to impose trusteeships. 3 9 The international's constitution contained no trusteeship establishment procedure, and the court concluded that a valid trusteeship could not, therefore, be imposed. Other cases have held that, even if the labor organization's constitution grants general trusteeship powers to the international, a trusteeship is not valid if the authorizing language is vague. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, for example, has read section 302 as permitting the international to impose a trusteeship only if its constitution or bylaws provide explicit and fair procedures. 40 A second approach taken by courts has involved a literal reading of section 304(c) so as to view a fair hearing as affecting only the presumption of validity granted to a trusteeship. The lone dissenter was George Meany, who stated: "Procedurally, Senator Kennedy's bill requires only that the union follow its own constitution, while the courts require in addition, that its constitutional procedure be fair, provide notice and hearing, etc. In this respect the bill seems to be taking a step backwards. [40:873 that had been imposed without a hearing. The suit was held premature on the grounds that the local had not exhausted its right of internal union appeal. 42 Relying on Congress's failure explicitly to make a hearing mandatory, and contending that any other construction would make sections 302 and 304(c) redundant, the court stated that noncompliance with section 304(c)'s hearing requirement precludes only the presumption of the trusteeship's validity. 43 The court rejected the local's contention that 304(c) placed absolute restrictions on the power of internationals to impose trusteeships. 44 Third, courts have held that both the legislative history of section 304(c) and basic policy considerations absolutely require a hearing for the establishment of a valid trusteeship. 45 In Local 2, Telephone Workers v. International Brotherhood of Telephone Workers, 46 a local sought to enjoin suspension of its charter, an action determined by the court to constitute imposition of a trusteeship. The trusteeship was ruled invalid on the grounds that the international's constitution contained inadequate procedures for imposing a trusteeship 47 and the international had not held a fair hearing as implicitly required in section 304(c). 48 Fourth, some courts have noted that, in light of Title III, the LMRDA should be construed as incorporating the common law hearing requirement. 49 This interpretation, although effectively the same as the third approach, avoids reliance on the ambiguous language and legislative history of the section. 0 This approach was adopted to avoid establishing an enigmatic third category of trusteeships-neither presumed valid under section 304(c) nor held invalid under section 30251- 42 Id. at 510. 43 Id. at 502. 44 Id. at 501-03. to which courts would have to apply a standard not provided in the statute.
2
The fourth approach is the wisest. Construing Title III as incorporating the common law hearing requirement is consistent with the legislative history, purpose, and substantive protection of the Act. 53 This interpretation also helps preserve employees' rights to choose their bargaining representatives, and minimizes the burdens of litigation on the courts, the local, and the international.
Interrelation Between Hearings and the Substantive
Protections of the LMRDA. The substantive protections added by the LMRDA cannot be regarded as substitutes for the common law procedural safeguard of a fair hearing. 4 The importance of several aspects of the hearing requirement is in fact increased by the LMRDA limitations on the power of internationals to impose trusteeships. First, the need for a full hearing record is increased. Before enactment of the LMRDA, the courts needed very little evidence to review the imposition of Hawaii 1969) ; Moss, supra note 34, at 17. Moreover, section 302 restricts the international's power to impose a trusteeship, but does not specify the procedures by which they must be established. Cf. 105 CONG. REC. 6677 (1959) (remarks of Senator Erwin, cosponsor of the Kennedy-Erwin bill, S. 505, that the trusteeship provisions of their bill intended to preserve as far as possible internal union control over union affairs. S. 505 was substantially identical to the LMRDA as enacted. See SEc'Y OF LABOR'S REPORT, supra note 3, at 145-47). 54 The statutory language and legislative history of sections 302 and 304(c) bar any interpretation that would read 304(c) into 302 so as to define their combined requirements as a complete listing of the requisites of a valid trusteeship. Cf. Moss, supra note 34, at 17; Note, supra note 34, at 1504. Section 302 lists the requirements for imposing a trusteeship, while section 304(c) does not mention either presumptions of validity or absolute invalidity where a hearing is not held. Nor does the legislative history suggest that the sections are to be read together. Rather, it indicates that their purposes are different. Section 302 was intended to limit the purposes of trusteeships; section 304(c) trusteeships because the discretion permitted internationals in such matters was very broad. 5 5 To determine whether there has been compliance with the limitations of the LMRDA, however, the reviewing court needs a full record. 56 Second, by permitting the local to refute the purposes stated by the international in its specific charges and to raise rebuttal evidence against the need for a trusteeship, a fair hearing aids the local in insuring that the international is not using the label of a proper purpose to cover an improper one, 57 misusing the broad fourth purpose of section 302 -"otherwise carry out the legitimate purpose of such labor organization" 5 1 8 -or simply acting on incorrect information.
Congressional intent to encourage procedural fairness is clear from the provision in section 304(c) granting an eighteen month presumption of validity where the international holds a fair hearing. 51 The statute should not be read, however, as merely denying the presumption of validity where a trusteeship is imposed without a hearing. 
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such an interpretation, internationals could be expected in each case to compare the benefits of holding a hearing with the detriments of not holding one. A hearing would delay imposition of the trusteeship but would give the international's action the presumption of validity; omitting the hearing would permit immediate imposition but would cause a loss of the presumption. In cases where immediate imposition of the trusteeship would cause substantial hardship to the local or would neutralize the local during a crucial period of controversy, the option of avoiding a preimposition hearing would provide the international with a powerful weapon. 
Democratic Control of Local Unions.
Incorporation of the common law hearing requirement into Title III also implements the legislative purpose of section 7 of the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA) 62 and section 101(a)(1) of the LMRDA. 63 Both sections guarantee to employees a right, although not absolute, to bargain collectively through representatives of their choosing. Courts have held that the LMRDA was intended both to minimize international interference with local affairs" and to encourage democratic selection of the local's leadership. 65 Nonetheless, no court has held that displacement of local officials by a trustee violates the members' right to select their leaders. Suspension of this right, however, should be permitted only to avoid serious prejudice to the legitimate interests of the international and only after the local members are afforded an opportunity to defend their right to elect their own leadership. 66 Members of local unions have a legitimate interest in preserving their autonomy against the international's power and control. 67 The international, on the other hand, must be able to control and discipline locals. 
[40:873
Union Trusteeship Hearings a body from the international provides an opportunity for the local to disprove the necessity for the loss of its autonomy and helps to assure its members that the suspension of their rights could not be avoided under the circumstances. 9 Leaving the initial determination of the need for a trusteeship within the union assures the international necessary control, 70 subject to court review.
Minimizing the Burdens of Litigation.
Judicial incorporation of the common law fair hearing requirement would minimize litigation expense by providing a single forum for the local's grievance and by increasing the likelihood of disputes being settled out of court through consultation and negotiation between the local and the international. Section 306 leaves intact the members' right to bring a state court action against the international for failure to hold a hearing; 72 section 304(a), however, limits enforcement of the substantive protections of Title III to the federal courts. 73 If Title III is not interpreted as requiring a hearing for trusteeship imposition, the members or their locals seeking to wage both substantive and procedural attacks on the trusteeship may have to maintain separate actions in federal and state courts.
Pendant and protective jurisdiction do not provide adequate remedies for this problem. A pendant claim would be proper only if accompanied by a legitimate federal claim under the LMRDA. 74 Failure to prove the federal claim might result in the dismissal of the state claim as well. 7 5 Moreover, the exercise of pendant jurisdiction is discretionary, so that the only safe course would be to bring actions in two courts simultaneously.
6
Protective jurisdiction is inappropriate, in this situation, to alleviate the pressures toward multiforum litigation. The concept of protec- The fair hearing requirement would provide scant protection to a local union if the international could manipulate the timing of the hearing without limitation; yet there are circumstances in which it would be grossly unfair to demand that the international endure the delay of a hearing before imposing a trusteeship. In an emergency situation, the international should be allowed to delay the required hearing until after imposition of the trusteeship, but only for as long as is justified by the emergency.
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A. The Present State of the Law
Courts generally have found that a hearing after imposition of the trusteeship can create the statutory presumption of validity. . 1970) , where the Fifth Circuit affirmed a district court order enjoining imposition of a trusteeship before a fair hearing had been held, holding that the determination was within the lower court's discretion. After the hearing was held by the international, the preliminary injunction was dissolved. 314 F. Supp [40:873 courts have granted the presumption when fair hearings were held from seventeen to thirty days after imposition of a trusteeship 8 3 One court held that an eleven month lag was not too long to trigger the statutory presumption. 8 4 Several courts have found trusteeships invalid because no fair hearings were held, but stayed injunctive relief to give the international time to hold a ratification hearing, and thereby gain the presumption of validity. 5 These decisions do not, however, reveal whether postimposition hearings would be sufficient in all situations.
In NALC v. Sombrotto, 8s an international obtained an injunction to force recognition of a trusteeship by a local that was threatening both to strike illegally and to bind itself to a rival labor organization. The court held that, regardless of the existence of an emergency, a postimposition hearing could validate the trusteeship only if such procedure was specifically provided for in the union's constitution or bylaws. 87 The preliminary injunction was granted contingent upon the international's holding a hearing as soon as possible on continuation of the trusteeship. 88 In Local 13140, UMW v. UMW, 9 the D.C. Circuit Court invalidated a trusteeship, holding that-absent reasonable grounds to believe an emergency exists-the hearing must be held before the trusteeship is imposed. The court added that in an emergency a hearing must be scheduled, at the time of imposition, for the earliest possible date after imposition, even if the international's constitution does not so require. Hawaii 1969) (the hearing was held twenty-five days after the trusteeship imposition; the court upheld the trusteeship on grounds that the local had waived its right to object to the tardiness of the hearing by not doing so sooner, and that the local had failed to establish any prejudice by the delay); Local 238, Laborers' Int'l v. Fosco, 80 LRRM 2081 (E.D. Wash. 1972 Because judicial interpretations of the timing requirement for fair hearings differ, the language, history, and purpose of the LMRDA, as well as policy considerations and the preexisting common law must be examined to determine when ratification should be permitted instead of authorization, and how long a delay in holding the hearing should be allowed.
B. The Language, History, and Purpose of the LMRDA The LMRDA provides only very limited guidance on the question of the timing of the required fair hearing. Section 304(c) grants a presumption of validity to trusteeships "authorized or ratified" by a fair hearing. 9 1 Long-standing canons of statutory interpretation require that the courts construe statutory language according to common usage, unless a technical meaning is explicitly indicated, and that the words be construed so as to avoid redundancy. In ordinary usage, to "ratify" is to legitimate an event after its occurrence. 9 2 This interpretation also avoids redundancy in the phrase "authorized or ratified." 9 3 During the legislative hearings on the LMRDA, Professor Cox 9 ' 4 stated that this phrase was intended to enable the international to impose a trusteeship and validate it later through ratification. 9 5 Neither the statute nor its history, however, reveal what circumstances justify "ratification" instead of "authorization." 96 Although there are indications that Congress was aware of the general importance of procedural fairness when it passed the LMRDA, 9 it is impossible to determine what specific limitations on ratification Congress may have contemplated. When faced
